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If the European Union is to be ready to 
share  in  the  responsibility  for  global 
security and building a better world, as the 
European Security Strategy states, it is evident 
that  the  Common  Security  and  Defence 
Policy  (CSDP)  must  be  strengthened: 
Europe still struggles to deploy more than 
4% of its 1.8 million troops, and still the 
major  capability  shortfalls  have  not  been 
addressed.  Obviously,  the  existing 
mechanisms for capability development in 
the  EU  (as  well  as  in  NATO  for  that 
matter) have failed to generate significantly 
more  deployable  European  capabilities, 
and will probably never do so. If no action 
is  taken,  one  cannot  even  hope  for  a 
standstill. Things will get worse, because of 
the  economic  crisis,  which  has  already 
resulted in yet another series of budgetary 
cuts,  and  which  will  ensure  continued 
budgetary pressure on all Member States. 
So the challenge is to provide the Union 
with more effective military capabilities to 
mount  crisis  management  operations 
notwithstanding  the  current  budgetary 
hurdles.  
CSDP needs a new stimulus. The Lisbon 
Treaty actually provides several, not in the 
least  the  appointment  of  a  permanent 
President of the European Council and the 
strengthening of the position of the High 
Representative,  which  can  be  hoped  to 
generate  more  strategy,  coherence  and 
proactive  policies  at  the  highest  political 
level.  The  extended  definition  of  the 
Petersberg Tasks and the adoption of the 
Solidarity  Clause,  allowing  the  use  of 
CSDP  within  the  territory  of  the  Union, 
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will help as well to set directions for future 
CSDP  operations.  Mutual  Defence  is 
another important addition. That leaves the 
required  capabilities,  in  which  area  the 
Treaty  introduces  a  new  mechanism: 
Permanent  Structured  Cooperation  in 
Defence (PSCD).  
Unfortunately, PSCD features high among 
the  provisions  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty  that 
some  EU  Member  States  seem  to  have 
forgotten that they subscribed to. Perhaps 
because  it  is  so  ambitious:  by  setting 
criteria for participation, for the first time 
participating Member States (pMS) would 
enter  into  binding  commitments  in  the 
field of defence and allow an EU body, the 
European  Defence  Agency  (EDA)  to 
assess their performance. This high level of 
ambition was clear from the outset, when 
PSCD  was  first  formulated  in  the 
Convention.  It  is  true,  the  Convention’s 
initial proposals had an exclusive flavour to 
them,  as  some  sought  to  create  a  small 
avant-garde  of  those  Member  States 
spending  the  most  on  defence  and 
launching  the  most  sophisticated 
armaments  programmes,  with  the  others 
being relegated to a secondary role. Such a 
scheme would indeed have been divisive. 
From  the  moment  however  of  its 
incorporation in the Constitutional Treaty, 
the  provisions  of  which  were  afterwards 
copied into the Lisbon Treaty, PSCD has 
been in the process of being rethought as a 
more  inclusive  mechanism,  aiming  to 
incorporate  as  many  Member  States  as 
possible.  As  EU-operations  have  shown, 
e.g.  in  Chad,  the  contributions  of  all 
Member  States  are  indeed  welcome  and 
necessary.   
Therefore,  the  challenge  now  is  to 
configure  PSCD  in  such  a  way  that  it 
strengthens  CSDP  without  dividing  the 
Union.  Rather,  PSCD  ought  to  increase 
solidarity  and  convergence.  No  longer 
seeking to establish an exclusive and highly 
political  vanguard  signposting  the  way 
ahead, the aim now is to create a pragmatic 
process  that  is  attractive  to  all  Member 
States, output-oriented and cost-effective.  
A  CONCRETE  PROPOSAL  FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
If the method is of necessity complex, the 
aim set by the Lisbon Treaty is simple: to 
proceed more intensely to develop defence 
capacities,  which  must  of  course  be 
available and deployable. So more quickly 
than  existing  mechanisms,  PSCD  should 
enable  pMS  to  field  more  and  better 
equipped  troops  for  the  full  range  of 
operations and in all frameworks in which 
they  engage:  EU-led  operations  under 
CSDP,  NATO, the UN, the OSCE and 
others.  Our  concrete  proposal  to 
implement  PSCD  has  three  dimensions: 
criteria, a permanent capability generation 
conference,  and  multinational 
cooperation.
1 
Criteria.  No  strict  entrance  criteria,  but 
well-defined commitments to be achieved 
by pMS by an agreed deadline. We propose 
an integral set of four criteria:  
(1) To be able: 
The  ultimate  objective  is  to 
increase  the  deployability  and 
sustainability of pMS’ armed forces 
                                                 
1  For  a  more  detailed  version  see 
http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/10/sec-
gov/SPB-9_PSCD.pdf.   
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by an agreed percentage within an 
agreed  timeframe,  until  an  agreed 
target is reached.  
 
(2) Solidarity in defence spending: 
pMS  should  harmonize  their 
defence  expenditures.  At  the  very 
least,  pMS  spending  less  than  the 
EU average
2 should commit not to 
further  decrease  their  defence 
expenditures, neither in real terms 
nor in % of GDP.  
 
(3) Solidarity in common programmes 
led by the EDA: 
pMS should contribute fully to the 
programmes of the EDA, which is 
to be used as the forum to mount 
collective  projects,  notably  to 
address  the  commonly  identified 
strategic shortfalls. Obviously pMS 
cannot take part in each and every 
EDA  project;  they  will  select 
specific  programmes  that  fit  with 
their expertise and force structure. 
But their share in the overall cost 
of  all  projects  combined  should 
reflect  their  respective  GDP,  in 
order to ensure fair burden-sharing 
between pMS.  
 
(4) Solidarity  whenever  CSDP 
operations are launched: 
As  an  expression  of  the  political 
solidarity  that  must  underpin 
CSDP,  pMS  will  participate  in  all 
CSDP operations requiring military 
assets  (of  the  unanimous  Council 
decision to launch which they are 
of  course  a  part)  with  significant 
contributions,  i.e.  with  military 
forces  deployed  in  theatre  and 
listed  in  the  Statement  of 
Requirements; the size and type are 
left  to  their  own  discretion.  As  a 
further  option,  in  the  context  of 
                                                 
2 In 2008, 1,63% of GDP.  
PSCD  the  pMS  could  also 
strengthen  financial  solidarity 
between  them  by  revising  the 
existing Athena mechanism for the 
funding of EU-operations.
3  
A  permanent  capability  generation 
conference.  In  fact,  Member  States  spend 
far more money on redundant capabilities 
than  would  be  needed  to  address  the 
strategic shortfalls. The criteria should go 
some way to ensure that defence budgets 
are spent more efficiently and where it is 
most  needed.  Experience  shows  however 
that even repeated calls to reconsider and 
harmonize  national  defence  planning  in 
order to focus on the common shortfalls 
yield few results. Useful inspiration can be 
found in the method used to launch CSDP 
operations:  a  Force  Generation 
Conference.
4  Although  such  conferences 
can  be  difficult,  as  was  the  case  for  the 
Chad operation e.g., in the end they have 
always  yielded  result.  Within  PSCD,  the 
EDA  can  organize  a  “Capability 
Generation  Conference”  aimed  at 
remedying  all  commonly  identified 
shortfalls of the Headline Goal 2010 within 
a reasonable timeframe.
5  
                                                 
3 Currently about 90% of the cost of operations is 
born  by  the  troop-deploying  nations  under  the 
principle of “costs lie where they fall”.  
4  Once  the  military  assets  and  capabilities 
required for a specific upcoming CSDP operation 
are identified, Force Generation Conferences are 
organised  among  Troop  Contributing  Nations. 
This  process  goes  on  until  the  entire  list  of 
requirements is met.  
5 In defence planning, the first significant results 
can reasonably be expected within 5 years, with 
cruising speed attained within 10 to 15 years. That 
fact should not be a cause for discouragement, but 
should  rather  stimulate  all  concerned  not  to 
postpone action any longer.   
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To participate in PSCD therefore, implies 
that  through  common  dialogue  pMS  are 
willing:  
-  To revisit their respective national 
defence  planning,  without  any 
taboos.  
-  To do away with national capability 
initiatives proven to be redundant.  
-  To  pool  assets  and  capabilities  in 
order to generate savings.  
-  To contribute in function of their 
GDP to the programmes launched 
to fill the shortfalls.  
-  And finally: to remain engaged in 
negotiations for as long as it takes 
to achieve success. 
In this process, the emphasis is put on the 
willingness of pMS, on the common quest 
towards  effectiveness  and  efficiency,  on 
convincing  one  another  and  not  obliging 
one  another.  As  is  the  case  in  Force 
Generation  Conferences,  where  Troop 
Contributors  take  sovereign  decisions  on 
their  respective  participation,  but  at  the 
end of the day solve the issue of the overall 
required capabilities. 
Multinational cooperation. The reality is 
that many countries are no longer able to 
maintain the range of nationally organized 
capabilities  that  they  possess  today. 
Multinational  cooperation  is  essential  to 
contribute  relevant  capabilities  in  a  cost-
effective  way.  New  initiatives  can  be 
launched  were  opportunities  for 
cooperation are identified, complementing 
the  existing  initiatives  that  will  thus 
become  part  of  a  more  comprehensive 
coordinated effort. The beauty of PSCD is 
its  flexibility.  Within  the  single  PSCD, 
overlapping clusters will emerge, with e.g. 
pMS 1, 2 and 3 cooperating in area X and 
pMS 2, 3, 4 and 5 cooperating in area Y. 
Cooperation can take various forms, from 
joint  development  or  procurement  to 
afterwards  equip  national  formations,  to 
pooling,  i.e.  permanent  multinational 
formations, either deepening integration in 
relevant existing ones (e.g. the Eurocorps) 
or  new  initiatives  (e.g.  European  Air 
Transport Command). PSCD can provide 
the  link  between  existing  bottom-up 
initiatives and the need for more top-down 
steering.  
CONCRETE ADDED VALUE 
 
The added value of such PSCD is real, for 
the  EU,  NATO,  national  governments, 
and taxpayers alike. 
Inclusiveness.  PSCD  is  not  to  punish  or 
exclude, but to encourage all to do more; 
the  best  PSCD  is  that  at  27.
6 Y e s ,  t h e  
defence  budgets  of  many  individual 
Member  States  are  relatively  modest  in 
scale, but together they represent tens of 
billions of euros – a chance to get more 
bang out of such sums should not be too 
easily  ignored.  PSCD  should  be  an 
attractive forum for those able and willing 
to join when it is launched as well for those 
that might join later. Those opting out will 
not suffer direct political disadvantages – 
but  they  will  miss  out  on  the  very  real 
benefits  that  PSCD  will  bring.  Hence 
realistic  but  real  criteria:  achievable  by 
every  Member  State  that  wants  to,  yet  a 
binding  commitment  to  do  more  than 
today;  open  to  entry  by  all,  but  ensuring 
growing  solidarity  and  increasingly 
                                                 
6 Implying that within PSCD bi- or multilateral 
cooperation  between  certain  pMS  cannot  be 
vetoed  by  another  pMS;  only  constructive 
abstention remains possible.   
 
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
5 
#1 
September 2009 
ambitious  commitments  as  the  process 
continues. 
Coordination.  While  preserving  flexibility 
and  bottom-up  initiative,  coordination 
through  the  permanent  Capability 
Generation  Conference  should  generate 
concrete  projects  to  address  all  shortfalls 
needed  to  fulfil  the  Headline  Goal  2010. 
This  has  proved  impossible  through  an 
exclusively bottom-up approach, which has 
achieved  some  remarkable  results  – b u t  
which has also reached its limits. Without 
collective  top-down  steering,  significant 
progress is beyond reach. Simultaneously, 
the Capability Generation Conference will 
allow those that seek cooperation to find 
suitable  partners,  including  for  deepening 
existing  multinational  units  or  setting  up 
new  ones.  This  is  not  to  pull  all 
multinational military units and structures  
into PSCD nor even to have some of them 
managed by PSCD, but to stimulate pMS 
to  use  the  full  potential  of  such 
multinational formations, and to use them 
as frameworks for common deployment – 
in this regard as well cost-effectiveness will 
improve.  
Cost-effectiveness. The criteria will gently 
oblige pMS to explore the full potential of 
four  important  cost-cutters:  (1) 
collaborative  armaments  projects  (from 
cradle  to  grave);  (2)  pooling;  (3)  role 
specialisation;  (4)  and  perhaps  most 
importantly, doing away with redundancies, 
for  Europe  does  not  need  1.8  million 
uniforms  and  the  combined  cost  of  all 
redundant  assets  and  structures  by  far 
exceeds  what  is  required  to  address  the 
strategic shortfalls. These cost-cutters will 
produce budgetary margin needed for the 
required  deployable  and  effectively 
deployed capabilities.  
Assessment.  pMS  will  of  course  decide, 
but the assessment role given by the Treaty 
to the EDA will ensure that for the first 
time their performance will be evaluated by 
a  neutral  body.  Simultaneously,  the 
Capability  Generation  Conference  will 
engender an informal peer review process 
of investment plans. Unlike ESDP, CSDP 
should be more than a catalogue of paper 
commitments.  
Significant  military  contributions.  The 
permanent  dialogue  on  defence  planning 
will allow each and every pMS to opt for 
the  development  of  specific  military 
capabilities  that  would  allow  it  to 
participate  with  significant  military 
contributions  in  all  of  the  potential 
Petersberg  Tasks.  That  requires  each  to 
focus on his own centres of competence, 
to acquire or further develop those military 
forces and capabilities proven to be scarce 
during Force Generation Conferences, and 
to  abandon  capabilities  proven  to b e  
redundant. This will considerably enhance 
political  solidarity  among  all  Member 
States  and  will  strengthen  the  Union  as 
such, at no additional financial cost.  
Boots on the ground. And what ultimately 
counts most: Europeans will have available 
and will effectively deploy more troops for 
operations, be it under EU, NATO or UN 
command  or  in  another  multilateral 
configuration. In so doing they will finally 
live up to the expectations generated by the 
European  Security  Strategy  and  the  Lisbon 
Treaty.    
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These are half a dozen good reasons why 
Member  States  should  launch  PSCD  and 
mark the occasion by a declaration of the 
European Council. The Heads of State and 
Government  can  provide  the  high-level 
political impetus that will stimulate Foreign 
and Defence Ministers to take permanent 
and structured action.  
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